Auslegung: A journal of philosophy, volume 10, number 3 (winter, 1983)  book reviews by Staff, Editorial
BOOK REVIEWS 
The Political Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. By Sonia 
Kruks. Sussex: The Harvester Press/Atlantic Heights, 
NJ: Humanities Press, 1981. Pp. 152 + xiv. 
Despite the fact that he was one of the leading 
French philosophers of the post-war period, Merleau-
Ponty' s work is still not very well known in this 
country. He held a position as Professor of Philosophy 
at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952 and then the Chair of 
Philosophy once held by Bergson at the College de 
France until his death in May 1961. He is probably 
most well-known outside France for his early works, The 
Structure of Behavior (1942) and The Phenomenology of 
Perception (1945). These works are usually discussed 
only in the context of his relationship to Husserl and 
extensive critique of behaviorism, however. His con-
tribution to contemporary European philosophy is thus 
generally thought to have been his success at trans-
forming themes of Husserl's later philosophy, such as 
the notion of the Lebenswelt, in a manner which made 
them relevant to discussions in empirical psychology. 
Kruks' is concerned with these works from a different 
perspective. Her concern is to show how one can also 
find in them the originating themes of Merleau-Ponty's 
political philosophy. But as will be clear from the 
following overview of her account of Merleau-Ponty's 
political philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology was not 
the only major influence upon this development. Nor is 
it possible to discuss the development of Merleau-
Ponty' s political philosophy without reference to 
historical and political events that also heavily in-
fluenced his thought. 
The development of Merleau-Ponty's political phi-
losophy can be divided then into three periods which 
also parallel distinct phases in his own intellectual 
involvement in French politics. The first period is 
one in which the foundations of his political philoso-
phy were being laid; it was in this period that he was 
most influenced by Husserlian phenomenology. What he 
sought in the philosophy of Husserl was a means to 
escape from the barren alternatives of "idealism" and 
"positivism" that dominated the philosophical milieu in 
France during the period in which he was educated, the 
1920's and early 30's. He probably attended Husserl's 
lectures in Paris in 1929 and later worked in the 
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Husserl Archives in Louvain. But it was not only 
Husserl's phenomenology that served as an alternative 
to the anachronistic movements that dominated academic 
French philosophy; there was also the phenomenology of 
Hegel. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty was among those who 
took up the renewed interest in the philosophy of Hegel 
which was the central event of French philosophical 
discussion in the early 1930's. What resulted was a 
political philosophy developed from such key Husserlian 
concepts as "intentionality" and Hegelian "dialectics." 
This led to a view of man as a "body-subject" (Kruks* 
terminology) living within a world where it is neces-
sary both to decipher and constitute those structures 
of meaning capable of sustaining political existence, 
that is, existence in an intersubjective world of con-
flict and change. Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of 
Hegel was, therefore, always existentialist. He was 
always suspicious of interpretations of Hegel which led 
to a closed view of human action and history. He also 
retained this emphasis on the 'openness' of human ex-
perience to new structures of meaning that might be en-
countered as we confront new problems when he took up 
the interpretation of Marxism that marked the second 
phase of the development of his political philosophy. 
This phase began after the conclusion of the second 
world war. 
Merleau-Ponty 1s concern with Marxism was part of 
that general debate over the "early writings" of Marx 
that emerged with the translation and publication of 
these works in France between 1927 and 1937, but which 
was interrupted by the exigencies of war and not 
revived until the post-war period. The post-war debate 
in France arose outside the Communist Party in that 
circle of intellectuals connected with Les Tempes 
Modernes, which included both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. 
Merleau-Ponty wrote in the first issue of the journal 
that the war had taught many French intellectuals that 
they were inescapably a part of human history. Many of 
them thus felt the need to make a decision about what 
the course of history should be and consequently made 
the movement from the Resistance to the Party. 
Merleau-Ponty was not, however, among those who joined 
the ' Party. He took up the philosophical analysis of 
Marx instead to defend what he saw as an emphasis on 
individual human values in Marx's early writings 
against the dogmatic and totalitarian interpretation of 
Marx that had been taken up by Soviet Marxism and most 
western European Communists. But he refrained from 
passing judgement on the politics of the Soviet Union 
until he was oblidged to do so after the outbreak of 
the Korean War and the revelations of the atrocities of 
the Stalinist purges of the 1930's. 
Merleau-Ponty had taken up the study of Marxism 
with the optimism that he had found a philosophical 
mentor who could help him clarify and expound his own 
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ideas. Like Marx, he had been an opponent of 
philsophical idealism in his youth, and, in opposition 
to all forms of idealism and materialism, he, too, had 
sought to place the concrete, lived reality of human 
experience at the center of his philosophical reflec-
tions. He could easily agree with the quotation from 
Marx which he had prefaced to one of his early essays 
on Marxism: "To be radical is to seize things by the 
root. For man, the root is man himself." He would 
later quote the first of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach 
against the materialism of the French Communist Party: 
"The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism 
. . . is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is 
conceived only in the form of the object or of 
contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, 
practice, not subjectively." He consistently defended 
Marxism against the narrow materialistic interpreta-
tions which had been based mainly on Engel's Dialectics 
of Nature and Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism, and, consistent with his earlier "existen-
tialist" interpretation of Hegel, he always sought an 
open-ended interpretation of Marxism (like that 
defended by Sartre in the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason). But he also took up wholeheartedly the cri-
tique of French liberalism during this period, a task 
that was made much simpler by the fact that the French 
liberals did not reconcile themselves to Keynsian 
economics, as had their British counterparts much 
earlier, until the early 1950's. Moreover, he believed 
that it was the implicit Cartesian idealism of French 
liberalism—its attempt to understand the world in 
terms of ideas and values possessed by autonomous, in-
dividualized consciousnessess—that had rendered it in-
capable of withstanding the onslaught of Nazi ideology 
in the 1930's. This is then also the period when he 
wrote Humanism and Terror (1947), a work which raised 
the unsettling thesis that it was necessary to defend 
Marxist revolutionary violence as the only means of 
escaping the more subtle forms of violence sanctioned 
by an economic system that can allow millions of people 
to become unemployed if the net result is a drop in the 
rate of inflation. 
Merleau-Ponty did not remain a Marxist. The final 
period of his political development began in silence 
and not with philosophical pronouncements, however. 
This was the only response he could sanction as edi-
torial policy for Les Tempes Modernes as a consequence 
of the Korean War. One could no longer give "critical 
support" to the Soviet Union after being convinced 
that, as Kruks describes his growing disenchantment 
with Marxism, "Korea . . . [was] sudden and irrefutable 
proof that the Soviet Union considered war with the USA 
and its allies inevitable and that to pre-empt it, 
Stalin was willing to commit acts of agressive 
imperialism" (p. 101). Nor could one condone capital-
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ist imperialism either. One must also remember that 
this was the period of the French-Indochina War and 
that Merleau-Ponty was among those influential French 
intellectuals who championed decolonialization—and not 
only in Southeast Asia. Kruks describes his dilemna 
during this period as well as anyone could: "If . . . 
there was no neutral ground between [Soviet Marxism and 
western liberalism], then there was simply nothing left 
to say" (p. 102). Sartre, in contrast, took up the 
position of whole-hearted support for the French 
Communist Party, a 'conversion* which came about partly 
in response to the arrest and frame-up of a leading 
French Communist on the eve of anti-American demonstra-
tions in Paris in June 1952. 
What should have followed if Merleau-Ponty were to 
have become a truly major political thinker of this 
century would have been the construction of a political 
philosophy that could bridge the gap between Soviet 
Marxism and western liberalism. What he wrote instead 
was Adventures of the Dialectic (1955), which is 
described as "a puzzling book. . . . [that] purports to 
show the apparently inevitable collapse of the Marxist 
dialectic into either objectivism (Lukacs, Lenin, 
Trotsky) or subjectivism (Sartre)" (p. 103). Merleau-
Ponty thus never really rose above that first period of 
silence and disillusionment with Marxism either to take 
up the project of constructing a Marxist philosophy 
that could indeed fulfill the humanistic promise of the 
early writings or show how western liberalism could be 
reformed in such a way as to prevent its deterioration 
into systems supporting the violence of fascism and im-
perialism in periods of economic hardship. At best he 
could only idealize Marxism as a "classic" philosophy, 
a philosophical system that had revealed something very 
important to us and which therefore, cannot, be ignored 
or wholly rejected, but which no longer forms a serious 
philosophical alternative in the sense that Sartre con-
tinued to think that it did. No longer a political 
radical or philosophical outsider, he now held the most 
prestigious chair of French philosophy; he also quietly 
supported the accomplishments of French liberalism dur-
ing this period. However, as Kruks is quick to point 
out, he never renounced the earlier critique of lib-
eralism in Humanism and Terror. 
What all this means, of course, is that Merleau-
Ponty' s attempt to construct a coherent modern politi-
cal philosophy beginning with the works of Husserl, 
Hegel, and, later, Marx, ultimately failed. Kruks 
seems to think that nothing demonstrates this failure 
more than the return to the "musty idealism" found in 
the uncompleted manuscript of his last work, The 
Visible and the Invisible (1964). Kruks, who began her 
studies at the University of Wisconsin, continued them 
at the London School of Economics, and who now teaches 
at the New School for Social Research, would clearly 
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have preferred a more serious effort to revive Marxist 
thought and criticizes him for a rather shallow account 
of the forces that shaped classical liberalism. She 
concludes, nevertheless, that there is still much to be 
gained from the study of his political philosophy even 
if he did "leave unanswered most of the important 
questions he raises" (p. 134). This, she says, is not 
really a weakness, but an important dimension of all 
political discussion, since it is a warning that any 
"politics of universal principles, such as classical 
liberalism or its Marxist equivalent . . . [must] fall 
into an over-simplistic rationalism" (p. 134). This, 
after all, is exactly what Merleau-Ponty had fought 
against all his life. This conclusion, however, would 
seem to be faint praise at best and far less than what 
we need from a figure who we are being asked to take 
seriously as a major philosophical interpreter of the 
formative period of the contemporary geo-political 
crisis—a crisis which can easily be understood as a 
sharpening of those conflicts which were the occassion 
for Merleau-Ponty's unfortunate lapse into silence and 
historical contemplation in the last years of his life. 
For matters have not become any simpler and it would 
certainly be helpful to have something more to build on 
than what he came up with in these final years. 
So it is that Merleau-Ponty never did discover the 
language of a "neutral ground" needed in the contem-
porary geo-political crisis. Nor whould we perhaps ex-
pect this from a philosopher who wrote essays with 
titles like "Indirect Lanugage and the Voices of 
Silence." Nor does Kruks provide any very useful sug-
gestions about how this might be done in her otherwise 
well-written and tightly organized study. Like this 
review, her book is long on political and intellectual 
history, but short on philosophical analysis. The book 
should not thereby be dismissed as unimportant, how-
ever. What she offers instead is a concise account of 
the philosophical and political development that has 
been central to the post-war French experience, but 
which, with its combination of phenomenologies, Husser-
lian and Hegelian, and its mixture of Marxism and 
Commuinism, will still sound very strange and incompre-
hensible to much of the Anglo-American audience for 
which she writes. Why should this be so important— 
even if the results are so dissatisfying philosophical-
ly? We now seem to have entered an era in American in-
tellectual life in which concern with what happens in 
Europe is of less and less concern to us, and, for many 
philosophers, only that which was first written in 
English seems to merit our interest or trust. If so, 
even if it does not prompt any renewed interest in the 
thought of Merleau-Ponty, Kruks' book ought to be read 
simply because we need to have a better understanding 
of recent developments in European intellectual histo-
ry, whether or not we ultimately decide to accept or 
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reject European molds of political and social develop-
ment. Or are we to assume that the cultural and intel-
lectual development of the United States has finally 
reached so high a level that this is no longer 
necessary? 
The book is another title, No. 15, in the Harvester 
Philosophy Now series, the aim of which is to provide a 
broader knowledge of trends in contemporary philo-
sophers outside those of the "mainstream" Anglo-
American variety. The book serves this purpose very 
well, but at $41.00 is outrageously overpriced. A 
paperback edition is also available, however. 
-JMM 
On Aesthetics in Science, Edited by Judith Wechsler, 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981. Reviewed by A. T. 
Winterbourne, Birmingham Polytechnic, England. 
The links between science and art have been ex-
plored in a number of ways in recent years, not only by 
specialists in these fields themselves, but also by 
philosophers interested in both. Attempts to bridge 
the "two cultures," either by showing that art is not 
so "subjective" as is often supposed, or that science 
is not so "objective" (the quotes seem almost obliga-
tory these days); or by suggesting that there is some 
way of thinking—"aesthetic" or "imaginative"—common 
to both, have become fairly frequent. A new edition of 
these fascinating essays is a particularly welcome con-
tribution to a widening of this public debate, at a 
time when the intrinsic and instrumental value of the 
arts is under increasing threat from reductions in pub-
lic expenditure in all levels of education, on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Although the ideas presented in 
this book could not, by themselves, provide a "justifi-
cation" for aesthetic education (do we really need 
one?) they might prevent decisions being made on the 
basis of a crude positivism which does no justice to 
the complexity of constructive thinking in science. 
This might in turn prevent the destruction of alterna-
tive ways of developing just those aesthetic character-
istics which creative science and mathematics need for 
health. 
The volume is edited by Judith Wechsler, who also 
provides an introduction and a brief synopsis of each 
contribution. In her introduction Wechsler points out 
that the theme of the book is the contrasting modes of 
scientific imagination used in the process of model-
ling. The lesson of the papers is, she says, that aes-
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thetic considerations, manifest in both art and 
science, are continuous and broader than either. 
The cornerstone of Cyril Stanley Smith's contribu-
tion, "Structural Hierarchy in Science, Art, and 
History," is the idea that the concept of structure 
provides a "universal metaphor" for understanding both 
art and science. His argument is elaborate and inge-
nious, and like other papers in this volume, exempli-
fies the use of an aesthetic sense in scientific 
discovery and argument. The idea that both artistic 
and scientific discovery presuppose what Smith calls 
"aesthetically motivated curiosity" seems to me so much 
more significant for bringing the "two cultures" 
together than the increasingly sterile debates concern-
ing the objectivity or subjectivity of the methods or 
judgments involved—a debate to which I admit having 
made a modest contribution myself recently. (Cf. my 
"Objectivity in Science and Aesthetics," British 
Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 20 (Spring 1980).) 
Smith argues that, in a sense, the very existence 
of any object depends on its interaction with struc-
tural levels on either side of it. Hierarchy is "an 
interpenetrating sequence of structural levels," and we 
fail to understand one another not because we have 
different viewpoints but because we attend to different 
levels of significance, though I am not sure that these 
don't amount to the same thing. A point of view will 
be (partly) determined by the structural level that one 
finds significant and interesting. I am also not sure 
that the author distinguishes clearly enough what is 
involved in the creation of art, with the apprehension 
of its products, in the comparison with science. He 
says that understanding the world in science concerns 
"matching" model structures with physical structures, 
while understanding in art concerns "the perceived 
relationship between physical structure and levels of 
sensuous and imaginative perception." It could be, I 
think, that some appreciation of art is like science in 
that it too involves an (imaginative) "matching" of 
model structures (paintings, poems, etc.) with physical 
structures. Perhaps all is, as Smith says, "pattern 
matching." But the pattern matching which is charac-
teristic of scientific understanding would seem to in-
volve the matching of a shared model with a shared ex-
perience, whereas in understanding art we may be in-
vited to consider a "model" which then modifies our 
public experience. The problem, I think, is that 
whereas the strategy of Smith's paper is to throw into 
relief significantly aesthetic aspects of scientific 
discovery, his argument also focuses on understanding 
and justification. 
Smith then analyses the notion of style in terms of 
structural hierarchy. Style is "a recognition of a 
quality shared among many things." It therefore seems 
that style is some kind of abstract entity owing its 
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existence to a simultaneous recognition of common 
properties: no single object can thus have style. 'X 
has style' must be elliptical for 'X shares style S 
with objects y, z'. Style is thus a relational 
property. This is in spite of the fact that whatever 
properties x has in virtue of which it shares a style 
with other objects must be possessed by it in itself. 
I have always found this aspect of the notion of style 
puzzling—although I appear to be alone in finding it 
so. Style, Smith writes, is "hierarchical," yet it 
resides at all levels, i.e., between any interrelatable 
levels. I am not clear whether this means that style 
"exists" at the interface of two levels—in which case 
it must presumably be "generated" by an act of a mind 
standing outside both levels—or whether it exists in 
so far as one level "refers to" or "reflects" the next 
level. In the latter case style might be understood as 
a relational property which can be possessed by an ob-
ject independently of being perceived by a mind. The 
"reality" of style would then be a function of the 
modifications of discrete objects in so far as there is 
some harmony with other similar objects. Smith writes, 
intriguingly, that a painting exists at just the level 
at which the widening perspectives of the artist and 
the narrowing perspectives of the scientist merge. "It 
is the scale of human experience, from which thought 
and imagination take off, and to which they must 
return." This suggests that a painting occupies an in-
termediate position between the artist and the scien-
tist: for the artist it symbolizes those humanistic 
concerns which impel him/her to paint at all; for the 
scientist it generalizes that analytic (perceptual) 
curiosity that is characteristic of the scientific 
enterprise. 
The phenomenon of style recedes, Smith says, as we 
approach the place we thought we saw it, and is 
replaced by a previously hidden structure. This seems 
to help us to understand why definitions of style are 
so slippery. Definitions attempt to capture style in a 
formula, but since style is a relationship between 
levels of organization (and thereby presupposes quali-
ties), definitions, by trying to isolate the "most 
important" qualities, always leave out something vital. 
Smith's thesis of interactionism must be taken as hav-
ing ontological, rather then merely epistemological, 
force. "Nothing is a thing by itself." Everything 
takes meaning and existence only in so far as it in-
teracts with something else. Hierarchy is thus an 
inescapable, irreducible fact in all systems that are 
not either completely ordered or completely disordered. 
This has an interesting parallel with how I interpret 
Kant's aesthetics. Kant's theory supports the idea 
that a work of art exists, and is understood, only 
within a preceptual/imaginative space which must be 
neither completely ordered and predictable (the work 
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would then be lifeless and boring) nor completely 
chaotic, (which would make it meaningless). Smith is 
saying that hierarchies exist only in this "space" 
between order and disorder. Could we then speculate 
that works of art are, in themselves, hierarchies? The 
problem with this seems to be in knowing just what are 
the "levels" that say, paintings, exist between: 
physical—paint, canvas etc., and perceptual--repre-
sentation, for example? This would appear to be compa-
tible with Smith's claim that "identity implies inter-
action," and that aesthetic pleasure involves some 
interaction between what is immediately visible, and 
what features on scales above and below this. 
In any discussion of aesthetics in science and 
mathematics the focal idea of symmetry is bound to have 
a prominent place. According to Smith, however, the 
idea has been overemphasized in these disciplines; its 
main value is in giving significance to its absence— 
disymmetry—without which there would be no hierarchy. 
This is discussed in some detail by Philip Morrison, in 
his paper "On Broken Symmetries." He argues that 
"broken" symmetry has profound aesthetic importance, 
but has been neglected in favor of analyses of 
symmetry. Broken symmetries are crucial in the process 
and realization of art and science. Like other con-
tributions to this volume, the argument is enlivened by 
juxtaposing a number of heterogeneous examples to 
demonstrate deeper similarities: here, the importance 
of asymmetry is exemplified through crystals, architec-
ture, and even a parable from Borges. 
I would make however, one exegetical criticism 
concerning Morrison's use of Leibniz's principle of the 
identity • of indiscernibles, or what the former refers 
to as the "indiscernibility of differences." Morrison 
says that once you walk into a Palladian building, you 
can't quite remember whether you turned left or right. 
The two wings are indiscernible. They become discerni-
ble only when you understand that one is a mirror-image 
of the other. Indiscernibility stresses the idea of 
perception: what is symmetrical under one aspect of 
perception may not be so under another. Symmetry has 
subjective quality. Now there is no doubt that 
Leibniz's principle is illuminating for our understand-
ing of the nature of symmetry, but not, I think, in 
quite the way that Morrision suggests. Surely the two 
wings of a Palladian building are perceived as diff-
erent; the problem is in trying to give a conceptual 
explanation of this perceptual difference. Leibniz's 
principle is supposed to operate on the level of 
"ultimate reality," rather than on the "confused" world 
of phenomena. Leibniz's point was that the perceptual 
indistinguishability must be resolved on the "noumenal" 
level. It was Kant who pointed out that certain pairs 
of objects which were mirror-images of one another pre-
sented a phenomenal problem. In spite of the fact that 
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Morrison seems to conflate Leibniz's problem with 
Kant's solution, he is undoubtedly correct in affirming 
that there is an irreducible subjectivity about 
symmetry—which is, of course, Kant's point. (This 
whole epistemologicl problem is quite splendidly han-
dled in Jill Vance Buroker's book Space and Incongru-
ence, (Reidel, 1981).) If Kant is right about this, 
and Leibniz wrong, then Morrison is mistaken in taking 
the problem of perceptual symmetry as being explicable 
on the level of "ultimate" particles. 
A common theme of these papers is that there is a 
point beyond which logical methods become inappropri-
ate, and therefore that there exists a domain inside 
which distinctions between science and art become 
almost meaningless. The power of visual models in the 
development of twentieth century physics is discussed 
by Arthur I. Miller in his essay, "Visualization Lost 
and Regained: The Genesis of the Quantum Theory in the 
Period 1913-27." Here, the emphasis is placed on the 
importance of visual models as a non-logical criterion 
for theory selection. These aesthetic criteria predom-
inate at the point where logical considerations cease 
to be appropriate. Aesthetic here means a choice of 
"thema," e.g., continuity or discontinuity, and this 
introduces the kinds of concepts made well-known by 
Gerald Holton. Using the example of the development of 
quantum theory, Miller suggests that a crisis in phys-
ics might arise because of a loss of visualization, 
with the concomitant failure of ordinary intuition to 
provide the right kind of framework. This obviously 
must be a matter of the aesthetic "style" of individual 
physicists; how much a physicist needs some visual 
model for what is essentially a logico-mathematical 
theory will vary from one individual to another. 
It is ironic that the Euclidean world of classical 
physics—the overthrow of which played such an impor-
tant role in the development of quantum theory—should 
nonetheless have such a powerful residual influence on 
the "aesthetics" of those scientists most involved. 
This is not unlike Bohr's "paradox" as described by von 
Weizsäcker, when the latter writes: "Classical physics 
has been superseded by quantum theory; quantum theory 
is verified by experiments; experiments must be 
described in terms of classical physics." (Cf. von 
Weizsäcker, "The Copenhagen Interpretation," in Quantum 
Theory and Beyond, edited by Ted Bastin, Cambridge 
University Press, 1971, p. 26). According to Miller, 
the transition from classical physics was difficult 
precisely because no easily visualizable models were 
available. (The visual models thus had an essentially 
heuristic value.) The failure of pure logic to deter-
mine a physical theory is amply illustrated by Miller's 
discussion. He points out that Heisenberg was 
concerned that the loss of visualization and "customary 
intuition" meant that the new theory risked "internal 
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contradictions/' thereby demonstrating a surprising 
lack of confidence in deductive reasoning working inde-
pendently of intuition. (There is another interesting 
parallel here with modern debates in the foundations of 
mathematics. Formalism appears to rely on internal 
logic, eschewing any merely "phenomenal" interpreta-
tions; while intuitionism insists on an "intuited" 
foundation for number which would have the consequence 
of proscribing that concept to what can be in some 
sense "apprehended" by the mind.) Miller's discussion 
seems to me to corroborate an idea that occurred to me 
several times during the reading of this book, viz., 
that much of the talk of "aesthetics" in science 
relates to what one might call the originary concept, 
i.e., as concerned with what can be, in some sense, 
"intuited," rather than with the post-eighteenth cen-
tury idea of aesthetics as having some ineradicable 
connection with art. This volume demonstrates—if 
demonstration were needed--that aesthetics is wider, as 
a mode of thinking, than both science and art. 
Miller's discussion of Schrodinger illustrates this 
quite neatly, and it seems clear to me that the latter 
uses 'aesthetic' in the sense of Kant's Transcendental 
Aesthetic, viz., relating to our intuitions of time and 
space. 
Seymour Papert's paper, "The Mathematical Uncon-
scious," explores the idea that aesthetic considera-
tions have a vital functional role in mathematical 
thinking. Where Papert differs fundamentally from one 
of his historical precursors, viz., Poincare, is in ex-
amining this aesthetic component in ordinary mathemati-
cal thought, rather than concentrating on major think-
ers. Papert tries to transform Poincare's theory into 
a more mundane but more manageable theory of routine 
mathematical thinking. Papert argues that mathematical 
aesthetics tends to be treated in schools as a "mere 
epiphenomenon," as the icing on the cake, not central 
to the serious business. This is no doubt true. Our 
art teachers have persistently had their whole enter-
prise regarded in this way. It would be ironic indeed 
if important figures in the field of mathematics and 
computer science—like Papert—should be in a position 
to make "aesthetic education" not only respectable, but 
noticeably fundamental to all constructive thinking, 
when those people, like the hard-pressed art teacher, 
should have so often conspicuously failed to make this 
particular case. However, it may well be that the 
reasons mathematical aesthetics are not taken seriously 
enough relates to the sometimes difficult place occu-
pied by art in the curriculum, viz., the problem of 
teaching an "aesthetic sense." Perhaps the very best 
we can do is teach various techniques, and give exam-
ples, and then trust to the (perhaps ultimately mys-
terious) synthesizing and abstracting facility of the 
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mind to see beyond the techniques in the process of 
learning them. 
It is clear from Papert's paper that he thinks that 
mathematical activity cannot itself be understood 
solely, or primarily, in logical terms without intro-
ducing aesthetic considerations. (This aesthetic sense 
must be seen as fundamental to making hypotheses, 
rather than understanding proofs. One can, surely, do 
the latter by means of logic alone—which is, presuma-
bly, why so much experience of learning mathematics in 
school is dull and uninspiring. What made the proof 
"exciting" is quite left out of account after the proof 
has "gone public." This is one of the profoundest 
differences between art and science, that in art the 
nature of the finished product invites an affective 
response from the public, which ultimately is the only 
sure criterion of its value.) What is at issue, ac-
cording to Papert, is whether in the course of working 
on the most purely logical problem, mathematicians 
evoke processes which are not themselves purely 
logical. It is, as he points out, a problem of 
guidance—of "navigation in intellectual space." What 
is significant, he suggests, is the isolation of an 
extra-logical stage in even the most elementary 
problem-solving in mathematics. It is obvious that the 
aesthetic sense is being isolated as a necessary condi-
tion for some problem-solving. Although it is clear 
that it could not be a sufficient condition, it is not 
clear whether it need not be present at all. That is, 
it is not clear to me whether any problem-solving--for 
a mind—could be purely mechanical. If it is a neces-
sary condition, but cannot be isolated and described 
externally, we seem to face the possibility that a com-
plete description of creative problem-solving behavior 
contains at least one component that is beyond the 
reach of logic. The same paradoxes involved in trying 
to find psychological theories of creativity would be 
raised in our attempt to understand ordinary problem-
solving. Papert's exposition of an MIT experiment in 
mathematical problem solving illustrates both the posi-
tive value of encouraging aesthetic engagement with a 
problem and the more mysterious educational implica-
tions. The aesthetic and the functional, says Papert, 
enter into a symbiotic relationship. Mathematically 
functional goals are achieved by means of a play of 
sub-goals formualted in non-mathematical language and 
drawing on extra-mathematical knowledge. "The func-
tional exploits the aesthetic." 
The significance of an aesthetic sense for an in-
dividual creative scientist is explored by Howard 
Cruber in his essay, "Darwin's 'Tree of Nature' and 
Other Images of Wide Scope." In spite of the consid-
erable inherent interest in identifying a scientist's 
visual metaphors, the difficulties of generalizing from 
a case as well-known and complicated as Darwin's are 
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enormous. The fact that Darwin not only employed "tree 
diagrams" as a way of exploring taxonomical relation-
ships but also took aesthetic pleasure in them qua 
designs, does not necessarily assist us in coming to 
grips with the theory that was to emerge. Could it be 
argued that Darwin took pleasure in the designs because 
they had the appropriate "fit" with the data to be 
explained? He would presumably not have chosen a 
visual model which was quite inappropriate for the 
emerging theory. Cruber rejects the idea that Darwin's 
diagrams are only heuristic aids for theoretical 
thought, without aesthetic significance. If this were 
so, he writes, "why the evident pleasure in the actual 
drawings, the constant search for the right metaphor, 
the emotional excitement conveyed by his punctuation 
and frequent resorts to a high-flown style? That is 
exactly that combination of feeling with concern for 
form and content that we have in mind when we speak of 
an aesthetic act." Gruber is well aware of the possi-
bility that while individual creative acts employ 
"images of wide scope," the communication of a theory 
may need to be anchored in the public products of 
thought, and thus miss the very aesthetic engagement 
with the world that initiated the scientist's curiosity 
in the first place. 
The tension that exists between an individual 
scientist's aesthetically motivated curiosity and the 
(largely) logical framework in which the resulting pro-
ducts are publicly tested, must lead us to wonder how 
it is that there is ever any "match" between the visual 
model and the world. Perhaps the structure of the 
world (or perhaps I should say the structure of ex-
perience) itself proscribes the range and nature of the 
models human beings use to describe it. We are, after 
all, part of that natural world. If there are laws and 
patterns to be discovered in it, our minds—distorting 
mirrors or not—will be subject to those laws and will 
find resonances in those patterns. The dichotomy of 
rationality and intuition reflects the objective/sub-
jective relationship of a mind with its contents. The 
external world may exhibit law-like behavior, but only 
a mind may reach outwards and apprehend the results. 
Since no two minds will grasp this law-like behavior in 
exactly the same way, our aesthetic intuitions will 
contain an irreducibly non-rational, i.e., non-public 
dimension. Our theories, however, must be publicly as-
sessable objects; the distorting mirror of any individ-
ual scientist responsible for the theory must be 
smoothed out as much as possible, else we will see only 
ourselves in our theories, and not the world of shared 
experience. 
This division of rationality and intuition is ex-
plored in the last paper in the book by Geoffrey 
Vickers. He proceeds from the premise that the idea 
that art and science are incommensurable is harmful to 
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both. Scientific hypotheses, inventions, paintings, 
new laws—these are all artifacts; human skill in or-
dering and designing go into all these things. 
Vickers' thesis develops from a distinction of two 
modes of cognition. The first mode depends on logical 
analysis; the second depends on synthesis, the recogni-
tion of pattern, and contextual relationships. The 
former—familiar as the distinctive method of science— 
concerns abstraction and idealization; the latter— 
unfamiliar if only because it is so very often implicit 
rather than overt—involves the creation of form, re-
gardless of the heterogeneity of the elements involved. 
Both modes, writes Vickers, are necessary for most in-
tellectual operations. We conveniently refer to the 
first mode as rationality, the second as intuition. A 
rational process is fully describable; an intuitive 
process is not. If then what is "real" is taken to be 
coextensive with whatever can be described, we reach 
the "disastrous" equivalence, Real = Rational. The 
intuitive mode is then, almost by definition, relegated 
to being irrational, or mystical; the cultural conse-
quence of this is that art becomes disconnected from 
all other modes of knowing. Knowing and designing, af-
firms Vickers, are not separate or separable 
activities. Our whole schema for knowing is a 
"design," a model of reality consciously and uncon-
sciously constructed and constantly revised. (This 
"positive feedback" aspect of "designing while making" 
is explored in a recent book by Andrew Harrison; see 
Making and Thinking: A Study of Intelligent Activi-
ties, Harverster Press.) The author cites Christopher 
Alexander's assertion that design consists not in the 
realization of form but in the elimination of misfit. 
(This idea can also be found in Nelson Goodman.) The 
designer has tacit criteria, which are manifest only 
when a particular design is inconsistent with one of 
them. Thus the norm is "known" negatively—only when 
it is infringed. (This common occurrence of not being 
able to specify what one wants, while at the same time 
being able to eliminate obvious misfits, is such a 
familiar experience that its epistemological signifi-
cance may have been overlooked.) 
These considerations have been made familiar to us 
through a number of sources, as Vickers is happy to ac-
knowledge, with Polanyi perhaps the best known. The 
epistemological implications have also become familiar, 
though hardly uncontroversial. "Facts," says Vickers, 
11. . . are not data." (What are data then?) Facts are 
mental artifacts, selected and abstracted from ex-
perience; they are "filtered" through a screen of sche-
mata, which is necessarily tacit; we infer its nature 
by observing its operations. The screen is itself a 
product of the process which it mediates, and though 
tacit, may be developed by deliberately exposing it to 
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what we want to influence it. (Is this what education 
should consist of?) 
Vickers then "applies" some ideas from Thomas Kuhn 
to our understanding of art. With mixed success I 
think, Vickers insists that Kuhnian paradigms are at 
work in art as well as science. So long as art worked 
within the paradigm of representation, its achievements 
were cumulative. It developed new ways to represent 
three dimensional space in two dimensions. Now it does 
not seem to me that the broad notion of representation 
could operate as a Kuhnian paradigm, given the enormous 
divergences of methods and styles of representation 
manifest in the history of art. But in any case, this 
idea suggests that the better we get at representing 
the world, the "better" the art. This is wrong, I 
think. First of all, not all art aims at representing 
the world as experienced, so the notion of representa-
tion must be widened to include imagined worlds. But 
secondly, and more importantly, this view would seem to 
have the consequence that the more "realistic" the art, 
the better it is. Apart from any other difficulties, 
this ought to mean the replacement of art by photo-
graphy . 
Vickers isolates two functions, which he says are 
never completely separated, but which are logically 
distinct as "reciprocating phases" in the process of 
mental activity. These are, first, the creative pro-
cess, which is supposed to present a work for 
judgment--such a process responds to both explicit and 
tacit criteria--and, second, the appreciative process, 
which "judges the work by the criteria, tacit and ex-
plicit, to which it appeals, and finds it good or want-
ing, or worse." These two phases of the process may 
alternate many times in the course of producing the 
work. The "form" is produced by the creative activity 
of an engaged mind structured by tacit norms and ex-
plicit rules. Vickers concludes with a reminder of the 
conceptual distortions against which we should be on 
our guard, if scientists themselves are not to be 
misunderstood, (and, indeed, lionized) and artists pa-
tronized (in the vulgar, rather than the useful sense.) 
We must not identify science with rationality, nor ex-
aggerate the differences between science and non-
science. Not all rational debate is scientific—this 
is obvious, but seems to need occasional reiteration; 
and while we must not exaggerate the differences 
between science and non-science, we must not over-play 
the similarities either. 
The papers in this volume are all the more welcome 
because they emphasize the aesthetic components of 
science from the inside. It is worthwhile reminding 
ourselves occasionally that just as scientific thinking 
does not have the monopoly on rationality, so the arts 
have no monopoly of creative synthesis. The arts have 
their formulae, and their techniques; the sciences have 
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their inspirations, their guesses, and their playful-
ness. These essays should be required reading for 
hide-bound physics teachers and obscurantist art teach-
ers alike. 
There is an excellent bibliography which positively 
invites further reading, and each section is well 
provided with separate references. The book is attrac-
tively presented by the publishers, and this new paper-
back edition deserves a wide and attentive audience. 
Contemporary Political Thinkers by Bhikhu Parekh. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982, Pp. x, 
219. $22.50. Reviewed by Howard Ross, Eastern New 
Mexico University. 
Bhikhu Parekh*s Contemporary Political Thinkers is 
a concise, well written critical introduction to the 
work of seven major political thinkers of the twentieth 
century. Very few will disagree with the selection of 
Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott, Herbert Marcuse, John 
Rawls, Isaiah Berlin, C. B. MacPherson, and Karl Pop-
per. Despite the fact that these thinkers belong to 
radically different political traditions, they were 
chosen because they are acknowledged to be major 
figures of our time. 
Bhikhu Parekh has had a lot of experience in this 
field. He is a Reader at the University of Hall in 
political philosophy, and he also has published several 
other books in this area: The Concept of Socialism 
(1976), Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays (1973), 
Knowledge and Belief in Politics (1974), Marx s Theory 
of Ideology (1981), and Hannah Arendt and the Search 
for a new Political Philosophy (1981). 
His purpose in writing Contemporary Political 
Thinkers is to explore the current state of political 
philosophy as reflected in the writings of some of its 
ablest practitioners. He critically examines their 
views on the nature and tasks of political philosophy 
by considering both what they say they have done and 
what they have actually done. 
As far as Hannah Arendt is concerned, Parekh ac-
knowledges the richness and brilliance of her theory of 
politics, but he adds that it is defective on several 
accounts. First, she holds two different conceptions 
of politics and fails to integrate them. Secondly, her 
obsession with autonomy prevents her from noticing the 
role economic forces and the class struggle play in 
shaping the language of political discourse. 
Isaiah Berlin's difficulties, on the other hand, 
arise from the fact that in the course of reacting 
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against monism, he swings to the opposite extreme and 
embraces an equally extreme form of pluralism. 
No one would ever make the mistake of considering 
C. B. MacPherson as an extremist, for his concern has 
always been to integrate liberalism and Marxism. 
However, MacPherson's thought, says Parekh, is open to 
several major criticisms. He is ambiguous about 
whether or not man has a historically invariant nature, 
and he pays scant attention to the nature and develop-
ment of human capacities. Consequently, he fails to 
transcend the basic assumptions of liberal individual-
ism and is unable to lay the foundations of an alterna-
tive theory of man. 
Moving on to Marcuse, Parekh claims that his polit-
ical theory, is highly uneven. Marcuse is a brilliant 
philosopher. His work, according to Parekh, contains 
profound insights, along with some extremely naive and 
untenable ideas. Parekh accuses Marcuse of advancing 
essential theoretical truths about man without fully 
explaining how he arrives at them. 
This is not Michael Oakeshott's problem, for one of 
his greatest achievements is his carefully worked-out 
philosophy of individuality. However, his political 
philosophy is still open to two criticisms. According 
to Parekh, Oakeshott considers theory as a generic 
category and erroneously argues that all intellectual 
activities engage in theorizing in one way or another. 
In addition, Oakeshott feels that philosophy's role in 
human endeavors is towards reaching an understanding of 
something, it should not be concerned about pre-
scribing. 
Karl Popper, on the other hand, is primarily in-
terested in prescribing the aims of government and 
developing the best methods of realizing these aims. 
Popper's problem is that he makes no attempt to under-
stand the nature and structure of political life. 
Nevertheless, Popper has made several contributions to 
several fields. Along with trying to link rationality 
with criticism, rather than with justification, Popper 
also has tried to refute historicism and naive ration-
alism. 
The final chapter on John Rawls, whose theory of 
justice has been deservedly acclaimed as one of the 
most impressive achievements of 20th century moral and 
political philosophy, discusses the limitations of his 
work. Parekh says Rawl's problem is to develop a 
theory of justice which can be agreed upon by all men, 
and yet is not biased towards a specific conception of 
human excellence. According to Parekh, Rawls fails to 
bring this about. His theory of justice does not adapt 
a neutral stance but is strongly biased towards liberal 
individualism. 
In conclusion, I found this book to be very in-
teresting, very insightful, and very informative. My 
only complaint would be over the selection of the 
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political theorists. A strong case could be made for 
the inclusion of Lukacs, Adorno, Sartre, and Habermas. 
Nevertheless, this book should be useful in advanced 
undergraduate and graduate theory courses. 
Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression, by 
Charles C. Lernert and Garth Gillan. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1982. Pp. 169. Reviewed by 
Howard Ross, Eastern New Mexico University. 
Throughout his life, Michel Foucault, currently a 
professor of the History of Systems of thought at the 
College de France, has investigated the cultural and 
philosophical assumptions which underlie western socie-
ty. Foucault*s many books tell how the madman suc-
ceeded to the social role of the leper, how the human 
body became an object for scientific study, how sur-
veillance and control replaced corporal punishment, and 
how sex became a matter for discussion, study, and reg-
ulation in modern society. 
Foucault writes on such a wide range of topics that 
his readers include many people from literature, poli-
tics, philosophy, medicine, history, sociology, lingu-
istics, and semiotics. According to Lemert and Gillan, 
Foucault is known to do most of his research at the 
Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. 
The authors of this study of Foucault are Charles 
C. Lemert, a professor of sociology at Wesleyan 
University, and Garth Gillan, a professor of philosophy 
at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Both 
authors are widely published in the fields of political 
and social theory. 
Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression, 
according to Lemert and Gillan, is not about Foucault 
the person, but about what he has written. More spe-
cifically, the book is structured around a series of 
questions readers asked or should have asked of 
Foucault. Each chapter, for example, tries to present 
Foucault in a manner that demonstrates his probable 
response. 
There are, according to Lemert and Gillan, at least 
four perfectly reasonable questions one should ask of 
Foucault's writings: (1) Where does he come from? (2) 
Why does he write like that? (3) What is he getting 
at? (4) Where has he gone wrong? 
It is perfectly reasonable for a reader to want to * 
know something of a writer's intellectual background. 
This is especially critical in Foucault's case, for he 
appears to come out of nowhere. According to Lemert 
and Gillan, this is partly due to his refusal to name 
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those with whom he argues, and partly due to his 
method. 
In chapter one, the authors explain why Foucault 
cannot be understood as a Marxist, a Structuralist, or 
a Semiotician—these being the traditions into which 
others want to insert him. They show that Foucault*s 
intellectual background is more a matter of specific 
problems to which he has been exposed to by his teach-
ers and contemporaries. Their view is that though 
Foucault works with a definite relationship to the 
Annales historians, Bachelard's history of science, and 
Nietzsche's problematic, he is more concerned with 
their questions rather than their answers. Foucault's 
main problems, as Lernert and Gillan see them, lie in 
the areas of history, the knowledge of man, and in 
language. 
The second question—why does he write like that?— 
is the most commonly asked question of Foucault. A 
great many critics have accused him of willful ob-
scurity, of not wanting to make himself readable. 
Lemert and Gillan apologize by reassuring us that, even 
though one can not be sure what Foucault is saying, it 
is evident that he is saying it well, but what good 
will this do if the reader cannot understand what 
Foucault is saying. They go on to argue that, even if 
Foucault creates the impression of obscurity, it is 
done for a good reason. Chapter two is devoted to ex-
plaining how Foucault's obscure style is related to his 
methodology. The authors believe that his style is a 
direct result of his methodology. Needless to say, one 
must understand Foucault's style in order to understand 
his methodology. 
Chapter three deals with the third question—what 
is he getting at? It is important to understand, 
Lemert and Gillan add, that Foucault does not write in 
order to teach lessons, or to promote a political or 
philosophical line. He does not present a thinly 
veiled discourse behind which is found a message. His 
writings try to accomplish two important tasks: (1) to 
explain the conditions out of which have arisen spe-
cific social conflicts in our society, and (2) to chal-
lenge established tradition, and, in the process, raise 
new questions by means of new methods. 
Finally, the fourth question involves a discussion 
of the flaws and logical inconsistencies in Foucault's 
work. According to the authors, there exists three 
questions for which Foucault has not supplied convinc-
ing arguments. 
(1) Given the absolute primacy of discursive forma-
tion in Foucault's philosophy of history, what rule 
does subjectivity play? (2) Given Foucault*s metho-
dological use of negation, silence, and the unfamiliar, 
does their exist any room for a positive content to his 
politics? (3) Given his use of discontinuity and con-
tinuity in his study of historical development, what, 
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if any, is the relation between these two historical 
modes? 
Along with Alan Sheridan's Michel Foucault: The 
Will To Truth, and Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow's 
Michael Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneu-
tics, Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan have provided us 
with another excellent account of Foucault's difficult 
philosophy. 
Cognitive Systematization: A Systems-Theoretic 
Approach to a Coherentist Theory of Knowledge, by 
Nicholas Rescher. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. Pp. 
211. $21.50. Reviewed by Paul K. Moser, Loyola 
University of Chicago. 
This book emphasizes the central importance of sys-
tematization in the theory of knowledge. It thus reit-
erates a theme found in Rescher's The Coherence Theory 
of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) and Methodo-
logical Pragmatism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977). 
After outlining some of the historical background of 
the concept of a cognitive system, Rescher devotes 
chapters to the following sorts of questions: What is 
the purpose of cognitive systematization? What are the 
alternative modes of cognitive systematization? How 
can we justify a coherentist approach to cognitive 
systematization? And what are the limits to cognitive 
systematization? Although these questions raise many 
important epistemological issues, I shall focus this 
review on Rescher's treatment of foundational!sm versus 
coherentism in cognitive systematization. 
The two major competing models of cognitive syste-
matization (i.e., of system-building for knowledge-
claims) are the Euclidean model of linear inference 
from basic axioms and the network model of cyclic 
systematization. The Euclidean model underlies a foun-
dationalist account of empirical epistemic justifica-
tion, while the network model underlies a coherentist 
account of justified empirical belief. Roughly speak-
ing, epistemic foundationalism is the view that all ep-
istemically justified empirical beliefs either are im-
mediately justified, i.e., justified independently of 
the justification of any other beliefs, or are justi-
fied by means of immediately justified beliefs. 
Epistemic coherentism, in contrast, affirms that the 
justification of any empirical belief depends on some 
justificatory relations to other beliefs; in short, it 
denies that there are immediately justified foundations 
of justification. When stated this way, foundational-
ism and coherentism are obviously incompatible. 
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One of the major claims of Rescher's book is that 
since foundational!sm faces serious problems, we should 
devote our efforts to the development of a coherentist 
epistemology. But I believe this claim is objectiona-
ble on two grounds. First, it stems from a misunder-
standing of the basic tenets of and motivations for ep-
istemic foundational!sm. And, secondly, it overlooks 
the serious problems facing epistemic coherentism. I 
shall briefly develop these objections in turn. 
Many contemporary critics of foundational!sm have 
suggested that foundationalism arises mainly from a 
misguided quest for certainty. But this is misleading. 
The major motivation for foundationalism is actually 
that it provides the most plausible solution to the 
notorious epistemic regress problem. Basically this 
problem requires the epistemologist to explain inferen-
tial justification, i.e., one belief's being justified 
on the basis of another belief. We have four basic 
nonsceptical accounts of inferential epistemic justifi-
cation: (i) inferential justification via unjustified 
beliefs (thus epistemic contextualism as represented, 
for instance, by Wittgenstein); (ii) inferential justi-
fication via endless justificatory regresses (thus 
epistemic infinitism); (iii) inferential justification 
via justificatory circles of some sort (thus epistemic 
coherentism); and (iv) inferential justification via 
immediately justified beliefs (thus epistemic founda-
tionalism). The foundational!st can construct an 
eliminative regress argument to justify his theory. 
That is, he can plausibly argue that (i)-(iii) fail to 
provide an adequate account of inferential justifica-
tion, and thus fail to solve the regress problem, but 
that his account succeeds. (I have developed such an 
argument in a work in progress entitled 'Justified 
Belief.) The basic problem with (i) is that it is 
doubtful that an unjustified belief can justify any 
belief; given this account we apparently can justify 
any belief whatsoever. And epistemic infinitism faces 
a similar problem. For we can construct an argument 
showing that if any belief is justified by an infinite 
justificatory regress, then we can justify any belief 
we like. (For the details see James Cornman, 
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel, 1980) pp. 135-38). But surely not every 
belief is justified. Consequently, we are left with 
coherentism and foundationalism if we wish to avoid 
scepticism. 
Rescher opposes foundationalism for two basic reas-
ons (see pp. 50-55). First, he finds it implausible to 
hold that there are self-justified foundational beliefs 
that are irrevisable and indubitable. And, secondly, 
he finds that even if there were such foundational 
beliefs, they could not provide us with certainty about 
the external world. But these are not good reasons for 
rejecting the most plausible kind of foundationalism, 
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i.e., a kind of modest foundational!sm that we may call 
'epistemic intuitionism'. Modest foundationalism con-
trasts with radical foundationalism by denying that 
foundational beliefs need be irrevisable, indubitable, 
or certain in some other sense. Clearly, if the major 
epistemological role of foundational beliefs is to ter-
minate a justificatory regress, then such beliefs need 
not be certain in any sense, but need only have suffi-
cient justification to provide nonfoundational beliefs 
with justification. Further, to terminate a regress, 
foundational beliefs need not be self-justified; they 
need only be justified independently of any justifica-
tory relations to other beliefs. According to ep-
istemic intuitionism, foundational beliefs are justi-
fied not by themselves, but by nonbelief sensory and 
perceptual states of awareness. (For the details of 
this account see my article "A Defense of Epistemic 
Intuitionism," forthcoming in Metaphilosophy.) It is 
misleading, then, for Rescher to suggest that founda-
tionalism commits one to indubitable and irrevisable 
self-justified beliefs, or to the thesis that founda-
tional beliefs can provide one with certainty about the 
external world. The foundational!st is committed at 
most to immediately justified beliefs, and he can con-
sistently hold that such beliefs justify physical-
object beliefs only with a high degree of probability 
less that 1. Thus, I find that Rescher's anti-
foundationalist criticisms leave the best kind of foun-
dationalism untouched. 
As for Rescher's alternative to foundationalism, 
the present book gives us only an outline. (The 
details are found in The Coherence Theory of Truth.) 
The basic idea, however, is that an empirical belief 
derives its justification from its membership in a max-
imally coherent belief-system. Such a system, to use 
Rescher*s jargon, is the system of truth-candidates 
that receives the best "overall fit of mutual attune-
ment" by our making the least plausible truth-candi-
dates give way to the more plausible (see pp. 68-69). 
Truth-candidates are "presumptive" or "potential" 
truths; they are not probable truths, but they have 
some degree of probability. Rescher calls these 
'data', and suggests that the deliverances of memory 
and perception may be taken as examples. The talk of 
plausible truth-candidates presupposes a theory of 
plausibility ratings. On Rescher's account such a 
theory concerns our initial assessments of the relative 
acceptability of the data. Prior to a systematic eval-
uation of the data, we are to assess their acceptabil-
ity at first glance. Summing up, Rescher claims (p. 
70) that the coherence theory rests on a three-step 
procedure: (i) Gather in all of the data; (ii) Lay out 
all of the available alternative systems of truth-
candidates; (iii) Choose among the alternatives by us-
ing the guidance of plausibility considerations, i.e., 
292 
by maximizing plausibility. By relying on these steps, 
according to Rescher, we can construct a system of 
justified empirical beliefs. 
But Rescher's coherence theory must face two 
serious problems. First, it must provide us with a 
nonarbitrary way to make plausibility-ratings. Other-
wise, we will be able to justify any beliefs we like, 
and in that case Rescher's epistemology will be open to 
the "isolation" objection that it divorces empirical 
justification from the empirical world. (In fact, it 
is arguable that any pure coherence theory of justifi-
cation is open to such an isolation objection.) 
Secondly, Rescher's theory must explain how it is that 
membership in a maximally coherent belief-system can 
confer a high degree of probability on empirical 
beliefs. Otherwise, we will have no reason to believe 
that such membership confers epistemic justification. 
Frequently Rescher suggests that on his account maximal 
coherence is just maximal consistency. (This is true 
even of the detailed account provided in The Coherence 
Theory of Truth.) But why should we believe that an 
empirical belief is justified, or likely to be true, 
just because it is a member of a maximally consistent 
belief-system? Lacking an answer to this question, we 
must conclude that Rescher's coherence theory is at 
best incomplete. 
In conclusion, then, although Cognitive Systema-
tization raises many important epistemological issues, 
it fails to substantiate its central thesis that a coh-
erentist account of cognitive systematization is pref-
erable, from an epistemological point of view, to ep-
istemic foundationalism. 
293 
